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The Enduring Quality of an Alluring
Mistake: Why One Person’s Intentions
Cannot—And Never Could—Be
Evidence of Another Person’s Conduct
Kenneth S. Klein†
Abstract
For over a century, some courts—relying upon the landmark Supreme
Court  opinion  in  Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon—
have admitted one person’s intentions as evidence of what another person
did.  But  Hillmon  is  wrong.  The  Supreme  Court  made  an  analytical
error  in  its  analysis.  This  Article  seeks  to  expose  and  explain  the
error and therefore demonstrate that the state of mind exception to the
general rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence should never support
admission of one person’s stated intentions as evidence of what another
person later did.
Introduction
If a person says they are meeting a buddy in the parking lot, and then
the person is found dead in the parking lot, suspicion naturally focuses
on the buddy.  In a resulting murder trial, the secondhand recounting of
the decedent’s stated intention could be key identity evidence—but is it
too attenuated?  For over a century, courts have struggled with this sort
of question.  This Article seeks to resolve that struggle.
Ever since the iconic 1892 United States Supreme Court opinion in
Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon,  courts and commen-1
tators have had the doctrinal latitude to admit hearsay evidence of one
person’s intentions to prove another person’s actions.  As goes the theory,
 B.A. (1981), Rice University; J.D. (1984), University of Texas School of Law.†
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 145 U.S. 285 (1892).1
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while the hearsay rule generally excludes out of court statements used
“to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” an exception to the hearsay
rule of exclusion is that out of court statements of intent are admissible
if the declarant’s intent is relevant to an issue at trial; if an issue at trial
is what were the declarant’s subsequent actions, then the declarant’s
stated intention to take such action is circumstantial evidence relevant
to whether the declarant later took such action; and if an issue at trial is
what the someone else did, then the declarant’s stated intention to do
some act with that other person is likewise circumstantial evidence
relevant to what the other person did.   Put far more simply, if Kate says2
she is off to meet Will at the airport at noon, then that is at least some
reason to think Will might be at the airport at noon.
As framed in the cases and the literature, the debate over this aspect
of the Hillmon holding—that one person’s out of court stated intentions
are admissible evidence of another person’s actions —largely is not a3
debate about the application of the nuances of the hearsay rule.  Rather,
it is a debate over whether such evidence—which in the right case seems
essential—is based on too many untestable inferences.  After all, neither
the declarant nor the actor is giving firsthand testimony, because if they
were, then the seeming second- or thirdhand account would not be
needed.  In evidence jargon, this is a debate between relevance, probative-
ness, and unfair prejudice.   When framed as a relevance debate, it is4
nearly intractable because alluring and perhaps essential evidence
nonetheless seems to stretch ideas of probativeness and prejudice beyond
a breaking point.
The 1975 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence appeared to try
to end this tension—to pick a side, as it were—but the Rules did not do
 Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295-300; FED . R. EVID . 801.  2
 Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295-300. 3
 In evidence law, “probativeness” refers to the degree that a piece of evidence may4
help establish a fact of consequence; “unfair prejudice” refers to the degree that a piece
of evidence may be overvalued by a fact finder and thus given more weight than the
evidence actually deserves.  Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 Is
Unconstitutional, and Why That Matters, 47 U. RICH . L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2013). 
Every evidence code in the United States gives judges the discretion to exclude
otherwise relevant evidence if the judge believes its probative value is substantially
outweighed by its potential unfair prejudice—in other words, if it could be relied on too
much and thus lead to an incorrect verdict.   Id.
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so explicitly (and perhaps not at all).  Thus, the jurisprudential tension
endures; it has become hard-wired into evidence jurisprudence.5
It is an unnecessary conundrum.  The assumption that the out of court
statement is admissible hearsay as a statement of intent is an analytical
mistake the Supreme Court initially made in Hillmon and which has
rarely, if ever, been fully acknowledged since.   In Hillmon, the Court6
was not actually confronted with intent evidence at all; rather, the Court
was faced with memory evidence masquerading as intent evidence. 
Buried within the declarant’s statement of the declarant’s intentions was
that the declarant was basing his intentions on some knowledge he had—
a memory—of what he thought another person was going to do.   As to7
that other person, this was not intent evidence; it was memory evidence. 
Out of court statements of memory are not admissible under the hearsay
rules.   And so the conundrum is never reached.8
Simply put, in Hillmon the Supreme Court made a mistake in the way
the Court described the evidence of the case.  As a consequence, courts
have struggled for more than a century with applying Hillmon.  This
 The notion of a hard-wired mistake is endemic and inevitable in evidence law. 5
There is a conflict between theory and practice in evidence law.  Evidence theory, like
many complex areas of jurisprudence, often requires careful, deep analysis.  Evidence
practice, which largely occurs during the flow of trial, usually turns on instinctive, im-
mediate decision-making.  An evidence ruling that is analytically correct often requires
a nuanced and sophisticated isolation of exactly what is the aspect of the evidence that
is being offered, what is the logical set of inferences—or evidentiary hypothesis—the
advocate is asserting, and how precisely the evidence fits within that hypothesis.  Yet
that ruling often is made in little over one second.  Simply put, evidence is a ground
war, and in the fog of war, mistakes are inevitable.  This dynamic has ramifications to
evidence jurisprudence.  There simply are not very many appellate opinions on issues
of evidence law.  Evidence rulings are rarely appealed, even more rarely lead to doc-
trinal development or change, and virtually never reach the Supreme Court.  So when
the Supreme Court resolves an issue of evidence law, the opinion quickly becomes
iconic.  Many lawyers, judges, and law students can tick off of the top of their heads,
by name, almost every one of them:  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 173 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
509 U.S. 579 (1993); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.  383 (1981); and Hillmon,
145 U.S. 285.  These cases are pillars of evidence theory, and are taken as articles of
faith.  Treating a holding is an article of faith inhibits reflection about whether the hold-
ing is wrong.
 Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295-96.6
 Id.7
 FED . R. EVID . 803(3).  8
342 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY [Vol. 37:339
Article seeks to expose the mistake, and thus unwind the problem. The
entire debate over using one person’s intent as evidence of another
person’s actions has been difficult, intransigent, and unnecessary.
I.  What Happened in Hillmon
The best exploration and articulation of the underlying narrative that
led to the Hillmon opinion is the excellent work by Professor Marianne
Wesson.   Hillmon was a remarkable lawsuit by a widow seeking life9
insurance proceeds, in which it was equally plausible both that this was
a scam by the widow, or a bad faith denial by the insurance companies
based on falsified evidence.
In very short summary, in 1879 John Hillmon was reported dead by
his travelling companion, John Brown; Brown said he accidentally shot
Hillmon while the two were in Crooked Creek, Kansas.   There was a10
coroner’s inquest—including but not limited to identification of the body
both by Brown and by Hillmon’s widow, Sallie—confirming the corpse
was Hillmon.   And so Sallie Hillmon sought to collect as the beneficiary11
of Hillmon’s life insurance; what was suspicious was that the coverage
was under three, all recently purchased, insurance policies.12
Life insurance fraud was common at the time, and the insurers refused
to pay the widow.   In the ensuing litigation over the insurer’s denial of13
coverage, the insurers’ defense was that the corpse was not Hillmon.  14
In order to establish this remarkable defense, the insurers produced one
Alvina Kasten, who testified that her fiancé, Adolph Walters—who
looked somewhat like John Hillmon —had been in Wichita, Kansas at15
 See generally Marianne  Wesson,  “Particular  Intentions:”  The  Hillmon  Case 9
and  the Supreme Court, 18 L. &  LITERATURE 343 (2006); Mimi Wesson, The Hillmon
Story, THEHILLMONCASE.COM , http://www.thehillmoncase.com/story.html (last visited
Jan. 28, 2014).
 Marianne Wesson, supra note 9, at 344-45.10
 Id. at 345.11
 Id. at 343-44; Mimi Wesson, supra note 9.12
 Marianne Wesson, supra note 9, at 344.13
 Id. at 345.14
 Mimi Wesson, supra note 9.15
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the time, writing to her regularly, when suddenly the letters stopped and
she never heard from him again.   The last letters conveniently stated16
(from the insurance companies’ perspective) that Walters was off to parts
unknown with a fellow named Hillmon.   The theory was that Hillmon17
conspired with his wife and Brown to buy a lot of insurance, murder
someone who looked like Hillmon, and collect the money.   There were18
numerous reasons to believe both that the letters were fakes and that
Kasten’s testimony was perjurious.   After three separate jury trials, the19
case went to the Supreme Court to consider, among other things, whether
the letters should get to a jury at all.20
Hillmon is the singular foundation for the contemporary boundaries
of statements of intention as falling within the state of mind exception
to the hearsay rule of exclusion.   The letters in question were competent21
not as narratives of facts communicated to the writer by others, nor as
proof that he actually went away from Wichita, but as evidence that,
shortly before the time when other evidence tended to show that he went
away, he had the intention of going, and of going with Hillmon, which
made it more probable both that he did go and that he went with Hillmon
than if there had been no proof of such intention.   In other words, the22
witness Kasten recounted an out of court declaration by the declarant
Walters about Walters’s intentions.   Because intent is a state of mind,23
the statement was admissible hearsay as evidence that Walters was
truthfully describing his intent, and Walters’s intent was relevant,
circumstantial evidence that Walters did what he intended to do.24
 Id.16
 Marianne Wesson, supra note 9, at 346.  Similar testimony comes from Walters’s17
sister, although the sister never produces the letters she describes.  Id.
 Mimi Wesson, supra note 9.18
 Marianne Wesson, supra note 9, at 375-81.19
 Id. at 347.20
 See FED . R. EVID . 803(3) (the hearsay exception for “[a] statement of the declar-21
ant’s then-existing state of mind”). 
 Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295-96.22
 Id.  23
 Id. at 296.24
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If we chart this evidential hypothesis—that Walters’s letters place
Walters and Hillmon together in Crooked Creek—it looks like this:
The first aspect of this holding—that a hearsay statement of “intent”
is admissible to argue by inference that the declarant had that intent —25
was largely unremarkable.  The second aspect—that having drawn the
inference, it could support a second inference that the declarant acted as
he intended —was intriguing, but debatable.  The third aspect—that26
Walters’s intentions could be evidence that Walters later did something
with Hillmon —initially was little discussed but was and remains a novel27
evidentiary construct.  Nonetheless, Hillmon immediately became the
go-to precedent for three evidence rules that remain part of contemporary
evidence law:  An out of court statement of a declarant’s “intention,”
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, is a “state of mind” encom-
passed within the state of mind exception to the general rule of exclusion
of hearsay evidence.   Evidence of a person’s intentions is relevant and28
material  to what the person later does.  Evidence of a person’s intentions29
to do something in concert with another person is relevant and material
to what the other person later does.
 Id. at 295-300.   25
 See id. 26
 See id. 27
 Id. 28
 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 now collapses into one definition the old common29
law dichotomy of relevance and materiality.
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II.  The Post-Hillmon, Pre-Federal Rules
of Evidence Debate about Hillmon
In the years in between the Supreme Court’s 1892 decision in Hillmon
and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, academics
and appellate courts struggled with the Hillmon opinion.  The year after
Hillmon, the Harvard Law Review reported it, without introspection or
critique, as a decision recognizing as an exception to the hearsay rule,
that “letters written . . . to show [the writer’s] intention” are admissible
“to prove that a man” shortly thereafter acted as he intended.   Similarly,30
the first edition of Professor Wigmore’s Evidence treatise accepted the
ruling without concern or comment.   Twenty years after the Hillmon31
opinion, however, an article authored by Eustace Seligman began a
doctrinal conversation about Hillmon that endures even today.32
To fully appreciate the Seligman position, a quick review of basic
evidence theory may be helpful.  Evidence law, and in particular the
hearsay rule, reflects the common-sense notion that firsthand information
is better than secondhand information.  This is for a host of reasons. 
Before relying on a person’s recounting of events, a fact finder might
want to have possible ambiguities in the story clarified, to be aware of
the person’s bias or sincerity, to know something of the ability of the
person to accurately perceive the facts, and to test the quality of the
person’s memory.  Cross-examination gives the opportunity to test
firsthand accounts in this way.  Secondhand accounts largely are immune
from these tests, because the account of events is not being given as live
firsthand testimony, but rather as a secondhand recounting of what the
firsthand account was.  Thus, in order to admit necessary evidence in the
most reliable way, hearsay—secondhand evidence—generally is excluded
in order to force the introduction of firsthand accounts.33
 Note, Evidence—Admissions of Declarations to Prove the Intention of the30
Declarant, 7 HARV. L. REV. 117, 117-18 (1893).
 3 JOHN HENRY  W IGM ORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM M ON LAW  § 1725 (1st ed.31
1904).
 See Eustace Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 14632
(1912).
 See PAUL C. G IANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 31.05 (2d 2006).33
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But as every lawyer and law student knows, there are many exceptions
to the hearsay rule.  Broadly speaking, exceptions can be divided into
three bins:  instances where the secondhand account is the only evidence
available;  instances where the evidence is a secondhand account but the34
person giving the firsthand account is available to explain or expand upon
the secondhand account if they wish;  and instances where the context35
in which the firsthand account arose is one which gives it more reliability
than so-called “ordinary hearsay.”36
The exception for “state of mind” is within this third bin.  A person’s
contemporaneous statement of the thought that is in their mind at a
particular moment is likely better evidence of what the person is thinking
at that moment than a later memory by that person of what they were
thinking at a point in the past.  So if the fact of having a particular thought
at a particular moment is relevant to some issue at trial, and if there is
a witness who can testify that the person enunciated that thought at that
moment, then the evidence is admissible despite the hearsay rule.
But buried within the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule is
a problem.  The problem is that one kind of thought a person can have
is a memory.  And if the state of mind exception can be used to admit
hearsay statements of memory as some circumstantial—and thus relevant
—evidence of the thing remembered, then the exception would swallow
up the entire hearsay rule.  By definition every secondhand account is
a recounting of someone else’s enunciated, firsthand memory.  For
example, if the issue at trial is whether the light was red, and the evidence
is Jane testifying at trial that Paul said the light was red, then that is just
Jane saying Paul told her his memory of the color of the light.
So this sets the stage for Seligman’s concerns.  Seligman focused only
on the use of Walters’s statements of intent as evidence of Walters’s later
actions.   Seligman argued first that it made sense to allow statements37
of intent as some circumstantial evidence of what a declarant later did,
but  it  made  equal  sense  to  admit  statements  of  memory  as  some
 See FED . R. EVID . 804, advisory committee note.  These are the so-called “declar-34
ant unavailable” exceptions.
 See, e.g., FED . R. EVID . 803, advisory committee note to paragraphs 1 & 2.  These35
are the so-called “declarant available” exceptions.
 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID . 803, advisory committee note to paragraphs 5 & 11.36
 Seligman, supra note 32, at 155.37
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circumstantial  evidence  of  what  a  declarant  previously  had  done—or
for that matter, as evidence of any fact now claimed to be remembered—
after all, a statement of memory is a state of mind which, just like an
admissible statement of intent, is circumstantial evidence of the truth of
the matter remembered or intended.   But, second, admitting hearsay38
statements of memory as evidence of the thing remembered would
essentially eviscerate the hearsay rule.   Thus, third, Hillmon should be39
repudiated—statements of intent should not be admissible as evidence
of later action.40
For his purposes, Seligman had no reason to ponder whether Walters’s
letters also contained a statement of memory as to Hillmon—this was not
Seligman’s analytical focus.  So Seligman never considered whether if
the letters could be used as evidence of what Walters did, then they also
could be used as evidence of what Hillmon did.
In 1925, John MacArthur Maguire was the first commentator to
discuss distinguishing between using the letters as evidence of the acts
of Walters and using the letters as evidence of the acts of Hillmon.  41
Much of Maguire’s article revisited the same conundrum Seligman posed,
but Maguire also considered whether the Hillmon doctrine at least should
be limited “to proof of nothing beyond the acts of the declarant.”   On42
this question, Maguire concluded that in order to use the declarant’s
hearsay intentions as evidence of the acts of another, the actions also
should be at least “partially attributable to the acts of the declarant,” and
even then the evidence should be used “hesitatingly and only after
cautions to the jury.”   Put in contemporary evidence language, Maguire43
was arguing that using intent to prove the acts of another is a special case
where the state of mind exception applies, but should be limited in the
absence of other components of the evidence.  In other words, Maguire
treated Walters’s letters purely as statements of intent, but nonetheless
 Id. at 156-57.38
 Id. at 157-58.39
 Id. at 158.40
 See John MacArthur Maguire, The Hillmon Case—Thirty-Three Years After, 3841
HARV. L. REV. 709, 715 (1925).
 Id. at 715.42
 Id. at 719.43
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argued that this intent evidence could be sufficiently reliable to be
admitted for one purpose, while simultaneously too unreliable to admit
for another purpose.  This is not a hearsay argument, but a relevance
argument on familiar probativeness/prejudice lines.
Simultaneous with the writing of Seligman and Maguire, courts
developed a patchwork approach to when statements of intentions could
be offered as evidence of actions.  In 1933, the Supreme Court summa-
rized this body of case law in Shepard v. United States:44
There are times when a state of mind, if relevant, may be proved by
contemporaneous declarations of feeling or intent.  Thus, in proceedings for
the probate of a will, where the issue is undue influence, the declarations
of a testator are competent to prove his feelings for his relatives, but are
incompetent as evidence of his conduct or of theirs.  In suits for the
alienation of affections, letters passing between the spouses are admissible
in aid of a like purpose.  In damage suits for personal injuries, declarations
by the patient to bystanders or physicians are evidence of sufferings or
symptoms, but are not received to prove the acts, the external circumstances,
through which the injuries came about.  Even statements of past sufferings
or symptoms are generally excluded, though an exception is at times allowed
when they are made to a physician.  So also in suits upon insurance policies,
declarations by an insured that he intends to go upon a journey with another
may be evidence of a state of mind lending probability to the conclusion that
the purpose was fulfilled.  The ruling in that case marks the high-water line
beyond which courts have been unwilling to go.  It has developed a
substantial body of criticism and commentary.  Declarations of intention,
casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from
declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the past.  There would be
an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were
ignored.45
In other words, the Supreme Court, cognizant of the concerns initially
raised by Seligman, concluded that Hillmon largely should be limited to
its facts.   Out of court statements of intention could be used as evidence46
of intention, when intention itself was relevant.  But out of court
statements of intention could not be used as evidence of action except
in unusual circumstances, essentially mirroring Hillmon.
 290 U.S. 96 (1933).  44
 Shepard, 290 U.S. at 104-06 (citations omitted).  45
 Id.46
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Completing our summary tour of the state of the law and commentary
pre-Federal Rules of Evidence is the 1955 article by Professor James
Payne, Jr.  Payne agreed with Seligman but reluctantly came to the47
opposite conclusion:
[T]he Hillmon rule . . . is probably too deeply imbedded . . . to be uprooted
at this late date as Seligman would have done in an earlier time.  That being
true, we are here urging the abandonment of the effort to apply the conjec-
tural and metaphysical distinctions sometimes involved in keeping the
Hillmon doctrine in its place.48
In other words, Payne argued—like Seligman—that Hillmon made a false
dichotomy between intent and memory, but concluded—inapposite to
Seligman—that therefore both intent and memory should be exceptions
to the general hearsay exclusion.  Payne apparently also assumed that if
the letters could be used as evidence of what Walters did, then they also
could be used as evidence of what Hillmon did.  In this way, Payne also
never considered whether Walters’s letters contained two hearsay
statements—one concerning Walters’s own intentions and another
concerning Hillmon’s intentions—rather than one hearsay statement
being used for two purposes.
None of these courts or commentators did an analysis of whether
Walters’s letters were actually not only two hearsay statements, but two
different kinds of hearsay statements—one a statement of intent and the
other a statement of memory.  If doctrinally Hillmon had been framed
this way, then the doctrinal concerns these articles and cases raised would
have been settled by the explicit text of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 803 explicitly provides that intent is admissible to prove the act
intended, while memory is not admissible to prove the fact remembered.  49
Similarly, while some hearsay exceptions require corroboration as part
 See generally James W. Payne, Jr., The Hillmon Case—An Old Problem47
Revisited, 41 VA. L. REV. 1011 (1955).
 Id. at 1057.48
 See FED . R. EVID . 803(3) (“The following are not excluded by rule against49
hearsay . . .  A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind (such as . . . 
intent) . . . but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered . . . .”).
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of the admissibility foundation,  the state of mind exception  does not. 50 51
And while some rules of evidence codify a bias in favor of exclusion due
to unfair prejudice,  the state of mind exception is subject to the general52
approach of Federal Rules of Evidence 403, which has the opposite
approach.
III.  The Post-Federal Rules Debate
About Hillmon
As I wrote at the beginning of this Article, if a person says they are
meeting a buddy in the parking lot, and then the person is found dead in
the parking lot, it is tempting to suspect the buddy.  That is the allure of
the broad holding of Hillmon.
The 1975 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence could be read as
closing the door on that use of the Hillmon opinion.  But that door only
was closed if a Hillmon-like statement was seen as having a memory
component to it.  Federal Rule of Evidence 803 states, in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of
whether the declarant is available as a witness: 
. . . .
(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.  A
statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive,
intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as
mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.53
There is a counterpart to this rule in every state code or common law of
evidence.54
 See, e.g., FED . R. EVID . 801(d)(2)(E) (technically removing co-conspirator50
admissions from the definition of hearsay but functionally indistinguishable from a
hearsay exception).
 See FED . R. EVID . 803(3).51
 See FED . R. EVID . 609(b)(1).52
 FED. R. EVID . 803.53
 See ALA. R. EVID . 803(3); ALASKA R. EVID . 803(3); ARIZ. R. EVID . 803(3); ARK.54
R. EVID . 803(3); CAL. EVID . CODE §  1250; COLO . R. EVID . 803(3); CONN . CODE EVID .
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The Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence state,
“[t]he rule of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, allowing evidence of
intention as tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is of course,
left undisturbed.”   The House Committee on the Judiciary report on the55
proposed Rules states, “[T]he Committee intends that the Rule be
construed to limit the doctrine of [Hillmon] . . . so as to render statements
of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not
the future conduct of another person.”56
So this would seem to resolve the issue.  Statements of intent could
be used as evidence of one’s own later acts, but not as evidence of the
acts of another.  Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick certainly think this
is what the rule stands for, arguing that the legislative history of Rule
803(3) is in harmony and clear in rejecting the broader interpretation of
Hillmon.57
That may be true, but many courts have continued to allow hearsay
statements of intent as evidence of acts by someone other than the
declarant.   Even within just the first decade following the adoption of58
§  8-3(4) (West 2008); DEL. R. EVID . 803(3); FLA. STAT. ANN . §  90.803(3) (West 2014);
GA. CODE ANN . §  24-8-803(3) (West 2013); HAW . R. EVID . 803(b)(3); IDAHO R. EVID .
803(3); ILL. R. EVID . 803(3); IND . R. EVID . 803(3); IOWA R. EVID . 5.803(3); KAN . STAT.
ANN . §  60-460(l) (West 2006); KY . R. EVID . 803(3); LA. CODE EVID . ANN . art. 803(3)
(2006  &  Supp. 2011); ME. R. EVID . 803(3); MA. R. EVID . 803(3)(B)(i); MD . R. EVID . 5-
803(b)(3); M ICH . R. EVID . 803(3); M INN. R. EVID . 803(3); M ISS. R. EVID . 803(3); 22A
MO . PRAC., M ISSOURI EVIDENCE §  803(3):1 (4th ed. 2013); MONT. R. EVID . 803(3);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN . §  27-803(2) (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN . §  51.105(2)
(West 2013); N.H. R. EVID . 803(3); N.J. R. EVID . 803(c)(3); N.M. R. EVID . 11-803(3);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518  (McKinney 2013); N.Y. CRIM . PROC. LAW §  60.10 (McKinney
2013); N.C. R. EVID . 803(3); N.D. R. EVID . 803(3); OHIO R. EVID . 803(3); OKLA. STAT.
ANN . TIT. 12, §  2803  (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN . §  40.460  (West 2013); PA. R.
EVID . 803; R.I. R. EVID . 803(3); S.C. R. EVID . 803(3); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §  19-16-7
(2009); TENN . R. EVID . 803(3); TEX. R. EVID . 803(3); UTAH R. EVID . 803(3); VA. SUP.
CT. R. 2:803(3); VT. R. EVID . 803(3); WASH . R. EVID . 803(3); W. VA. R. EVID . 803(3);
W IS. STAT. ANN . §  908.03(3) (West 2009); WYO . R. EVID . 803(3).
 FED. R. EVID . 803(3) advisory committee’s note (citation omitted). 55
 H.R. REP. NO . 93-650, at 12  (1973), reprinted in  1974  U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7075,56
7087.
 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &  LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.39, at 824-57
25 (3d ed. 2003).
 See Joseph A. Devall, Jr., Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) Should Be58
Amended to Exclude Statements Offered to Prove the Subsequent Conduct of a
Nondeclarant: Guidance From Louisiana, 78 TUL. L. REV. 911, 916-35 (2004).
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the Federal Rules of Evidence, the circuits were divided over the use of
one person’s intentions as evidence of another person’s actions.    Over59
the next two decades, the divide widened and invaded the state courts.60
Why is the broader holding of Hillmon so enduring?  Consider how
Professor Wesson answered the question of why the Court promulgated
the broader holding in the first place: “What could account for the Court’s
unconvincing reasoning and doubtful rulemaking in the Hillmon case?
[N]arrative exigencies, rather than any policy views regarding the
advisability of a hearsay exception for statements of intention, drove the
Court’s 1892 decision in the Hillmon case.”   In other words, a good61
story and an emotionally compelling piece of evidence can lead to bad
law.   Professors Merritt and Simmons attribute the same psychology62
to the continuing vitality of the broad interpretation and application of
Hillmon in the courts, noting that when a person states an intention to go
meet someone, and that is the best evidence that they did so, “the tempta-
tion to follow Hillmon’s broader holding is strong.”63
Of course, no court is explicitly, intentionally flouting a clear com-
mand of the rules of evidence.  But nowhere in the Rule or the Advisory
Notes is there any explicit statement that Hillmon is understood to be a
fact pattern involving two statements—one a statement of intent and the
other a statement of memory.
Rule 803(3) allows admission of hearsay statements of intent as
evidence of the acts intended and excludes hearsay statements of memory
as evidence of the thing remembered.  The Advisory Committee, in
explaining the Rule, could have held either of two views—each consistent
with the text of the Rule:
 See Diane Kiesel, One Person’s Thoughts, Another Person’s Acts: How the59
Federal Circuit Courts Interpret the Hillmon Doctrine, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 699, 716-
30 (1984).
 See Joseph A. Devall, Jr., Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) Should Be60
Amended to Exclude Statements Offered to Prove the Subsequent Conduct of a
Nondeclarant: Guidance From Louisiana, 78 TUL. L. REV. 911, 916-35 (2004).
 Marianne Wesson, supra note 9, at 348, 350.61
 See Glen Weissenberger, Judge Wirk Confronts Mr. Hillmon: A Narrative Hav-62
ing Something to Do with the Law of Evidence, 81 B.U. L. REV. 707, 734 (2001).
 DEBORAH JONES MERRITT &  RIC SIM M ONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE 521 (2d ed.63
2012).
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1. Walters’s statement is making two assertions, one of Walters’s
intent to do something and the other of Walters’s recollection of
something he knows (and remembers) about Hillmon.
2. Walters’s statement of intent is sufficiently probative to be
admissible evidence of what Walters did, but is not sufficiently
probative to be admissible evidence of what Hillmon did.
The Advisory Committee Notes do not tell us which view the Committee
took.  And by not doing so, the Advisory Committee left room for later
courts  to  assume  the  second  view,  and  thus  apply the rule as written;
this, in turn, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, gives courts discretion
to come to a different probativeness/prejudice balance than did the
Advisory Committee.  Thus, if a court understands a Hillmon-like state-
ment as purely a single statement of a declarant’s intent—not of memory
—and then admits that statement as evidence of a non-declarant’s actions,
then the rule as phrased would still allow that.  The court would simply
be exercising its authority granted under Federal Rule of Evidence 403
to come to a different conclusion—on the facts of the particular case at
hand—than the one the Advisory Committee presaged would generally
apply.
And indeed, it appears that virtually every court that applies Rule
803(3) today sees the matter purely as a probativeness/prejudice balance
—a matter generally and typically within the discretion of the court to
resolve on a case-by-case basis.   Courts simply do not see the possibility64
that a Hillmon-like statement contains two statements—one of memory
and one of intent—and so do not engage in an analysis on that basis.  And
so Hillmon-like statements continue to be a problem courts encounter,
struggle with, and differ on.65
 See Lynn McLain, “I’m Going to Dinner With Frank”: Admissibility of Nontesti-64
monial Statements of Intent to Prove the Actions of Someone Other Than the Speaker—
And the Role of the Due Process Clause, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 389-416 (2010)
(providing a review of court approaches); see, e.g., United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d
353, 376 n.14 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he possible unreliability of the inference to be drawn
from the present intention [of the declarant] is a matter going to the weight of the
evidence.”), cert. denied, 544 F.2d 353 (1977); see also Coy v. Renico, 414 F. Supp.
2d. 744, 766-72 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
 McLain, supra note 64, at 389-416.65
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Commentators have done little to resolve that struggle.  In 1985,
Professor Douglass McFarland asserted that using one person’s statement
of intent as evidence of the actions of another person was a “giant step,”
for which “no court has offered a carefully reasoned analysis that would
support the admission of such statement.”   McFarland then offers that66
analysis: “implicit in [the declarant’s] statement . . . [of] his present
intention is also [the non-declarant’s] intention previously expressed to
him” and so “[t]he Hillmon doctrine would thus serve to admit each level
of hearsay in the entire statement.”   In other words, McFarland saw two67
statements within Hillmon-like evidence, but saw both as statements of
intent, each of which needed its own admissibility analysis, but ultimately
each of which could survive a hearsay screen.  He did not identify that
one of those levels might not be a statement of intent at all, but rather a
statement of memory.
Six years later, Professor Glen Weissenberger saw the same necessity
for a two-level analysis, did the analysis slightly differently, and also
concluded that the statement of one person’s intentions could be used as
admissible evidence of another person’s actions.   Weissenberger argued,68
“under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an indirect statement, whether its
reference is internal or external, is not hearsay because it does not
intentionally assert the matter sought to be proven by the out-of-court
conduct or utterance.”   And thus he returned to the traditional approach69
to the broad Hillmon rule: “Whether these statements may be received
as proof of subsequent events is a matter of relevancy and circumstantial
proof.”70
The only place I can find an explicit articulation that the broad holding
of Hillmon is absolutely wrong—that the Hillmon Court’s opinion fails
to see the embedded statement of memory—is in two evidence texts.  In
their coursebook, Professors Merritt and Simmons recognize that a
Hillmon-like  statement  of  intent  “breaks  into  two  parts . . . the declar-
ant’s intention . . . and . . . his belief [about another],” and then draw the
 Douglas D. McFarland, Dead Men Tell Tales: Thirty Times Three Years of the66
Judicial Process After Hillmon, 30 V ILL. L. REV. 1, 22, 25 (1985).
 Id. at 26.67
 Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule68
803(3), 64 TEM PLE L. REV. 145, 146-58 (1991).
 Id. at 152.69
 Id. at 158.70
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conclusion that the part that is the “declarant’s belief . . . is not admis-
sible.”   The evidence treatise by Mueller and Kirkpatrick similarly gives71
a mixed treatment to the broad holding of Hillmon.   The authors char-72
acterize the broad holding of Hillmon as a “backward-looking” inference,
but then seem to approve of this inference as proper evidence.73
Of course, in the broad context of evidence law, this particular corner
of a specialized application of a particular aspect of an exclusion to the
hearsay rule is a small doctrinal corner.  Given the nature of a course
book or treatise surveying the entirety of evidence law, neither of these
two texts explain their position at any length, and so it is not surprising
that the problems with Hillmon endure without articulated introspection.
IV.  Unpacking Hillmon
So this then brings us to the point of this Article: while the language
of the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) may have left wiggle room, the
correct underlying analytical frame actually does not.  There is no
analytically defensible way to characterize the broad holding of Hillmon
as a rule about the use of intent evidence.
Walters actually was making more than one assertion, and the asser-
tion that actually matters was not an assertion of Walters’s intent.  Rather,
it was a statement of memory, offered to prove the truth of the matter
being remembered.  That is inadmissible hearsay.  That is the analysis
that the Advisory Committee apparently made, assumed everyone saw,
and so did not actually explain.  And that is the explanation that courts
have failed to see, which in turn has led to a continued misapplication
of the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule of exclusion.  74
 MERRITT &  SIM M ONS, supra note 63, at 520.  For a more typical discussion of71
Hillmon, see RICHARD O. LEM PERT ET AL., A  MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEM S, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 619 (4th ed. 2011) (“There is, however, good
reason to allow a statement of intent to do something with another to show both the
speaker’s and the other’s action . . . .”) or RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE:
TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 494-99 (7th ed. 2012)
(no discussion of the details of Hillmon).
 MUELLER &  K IRKPATRICK, supra note 57, at 815.72
 Id. at 815, 816-17.73
 As typically framed in the courts and in the Code, there is arguable legitimacy to74
both a “yes” or a “no” answer to the question:  Is one person’s intention admissible
evidence of another person’s actions?  The “yes” position is that especially in light of
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Carefully unpacking first the state of mind exception and then Hillmon
exposes why.
The starting point is to juxtapose two examples in order to focus on
precisely what hearsay content the state of mind exception removes from
the general hearsay exclusion.  The first example is a car accident.  Drake,
the driver of one of the cars, eventually dies of his injuries.  But he dies
only after several days of hospitalization.  His estate brings a lawsuit
against Otto, the other driver.  One of the aspects of damages is compen-
sation for the pain that Drake was in in the days in between the accident
and Drake’s death.  In order to prove an entitlement to pain and suffering
damages, the plaintiffs call several witnesses to testify that after the
accident and before his death, Drake described to the hospital staff and
to his family that he was feeling “almost unbearable pain”:
This is precisely the kind of evidence the state of mind exception is
designed to allow in.  The witnesses’ testimony are recounting out of
court statements.  Those statements assert something the declarant is
feeling.  What the declarant is feeling is relevant to the case.  And so this
is admissible hearsay because it fits within the state of mind exception.
Our second example is the above-quoted, infamous case of Dr. Sam
Shepard.  Dr. Shepard was charged with murdering his wife.  Mrs.
Shepard died of poisoning.  Dr. Shepard claimed it was suicide.  Several
weeks elapsed in between when Mrs. Shepard swallowed the poison and
her eventual death.  In order to prove that Dr. Shepard was a murderer,
the liberal definition of relevance codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and the
liberal bias for admissibility codified in Rule 403, the evidence is admissible and the
fact finder will make of it what they will.  The “no” position has been that the inference
is so attenuated that it simply is a bridge too far.
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the prosecutor called a nurse to testify that at some juncture during these
weeks of hospitalization, Mrs. Shepard was awake, lucid, and seemingly
recovering, and said to a nurse, “Dr. Shepard has poisoned me.”  A
diagram of this evidence looks like this:
Now this might, at first blush, look almost indistinguishable from the
diagram of the testimony about what Drake said.  But to truly make the
diagram analytically pertinent to the state of mind exception, we would
have to strip out the content of what Mrs. Shepard said substantively, and
only look at what she said was her state of mind:
We now can see at a glance that, diagrammed this way, the state of
mind assertion provides no relevant evidence of who poisoned Mrs.
Shepard.  There is no dispute that, at some point, Mrs. Shepard was lucid
and capable of memory.  It does not advance any trial position.  What
we need for the trial testimony to be relevant is what Mrs. Shepard
remembered.  But that is an unsupported conclusion from the admissible
evidence.
And so with this we can see our first state of mind principle: (1) The
state of mind exception applies to the state of mind, not to the reason for
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the state of mind.  Put another way, sometimes an out of court statement
has to be parsed. For example, if the out of court declarant says, “I am
angry because my son just called me a bad name,” the hearsay is
admissible to prove the truth of the asserted state of mind (“I am angry”),
but not to prove the truth of the reason for it (“because my son just called
me a bad name”).  The “because” part is not a state of mind; rather, it is
a memory of a past factual occurrence.  It is precisely the kind of thing
the hearsay rule is meant to exclude.  The state of mind exception does
not encompass it.
And this is why the state of mind exception applies to the car accident
example but not to the Shepard murder trial.  Let us recast each out-of-
court declaration into a “because” format: (1) Drake: “I am in almost
unbearable pain BECAUSE I was in a car accident” and (2) Mrs. Shepard
“My memory is back and I need to talk to you BECAUSE I just remem-
bered that Dr. Shepard poisoned me.”  In both declarations, the informa-
tion before the “because” is a state of mind and so admissible hearsay,
but everything after the “because” is hearsay which is not a state of mind
but rather an assertion of external facts.  In the first example, the state
of mind of feeling pain is relevant to the issues in the case.  In the second
example, the state of mind of remembering something is not, in and of
itself, relevant to the case.   And while the cause of the state of mind75
(memory) is circumstantial evidence of something that is relevant to the
case—that the thing remembered did, in fact, occur—Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(3) explicitly excludes memory evidence offered for this
purpose.
This, then, highlights the second and third state of mind principles:
(2) The state of mind exception does not in and of itself result in the
admission of hearsay evidence; hearsay evidence that is state of mind
still may be excluded unless it is relevant to the issue the proponent is
seeking to prove; and (3) having a memory of something, while relevant
 In our first example, the state of mind was feeling pain.  We needed it to be true75
that Drake was feeling pain.  The parallel to that in this second example is that we need
it to be true that Mrs. Shepard was remembering something.  But in this second
example, that is not what we need to be true.  Rather, what we need to be true is that
what Mrs. Shepard remembers is true.  And that is not an internal thought or feeling (a
“state of mind”), rather it is an external fact.  And so it is hearsay to which the state of
mind exception does not apply.
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to whether that event occurred, is not admissible as relevant evidence
that it occurred.
Principle (3)—and how it works differently for memory as opposed
to other states of mind—can be illustrated by returning again to our first
example:
In the example, Drake’s statement of how he is feeling at a particular
moment in time is used as direct evidence of that exact question—how
was Drake feeling at that moment in time?  But what if the question was
whether Drake was in pain the day before, or the day after, Drake spoke? 
In both instances, again, the statement is admissible because now it is
circumstantial evidence of both positions.  A person in pain one day is
somewhat more likely than not to be in pain the day before, or the day
after.  But then slightly alter Drake’s statement, where he says, “I was
in unbearable pain yesterday.”  Is it still admissible as circumstantial
evidence of Drake’s pain the day before Drake spoke?  No.  Here, Rule
803(3) explicitly provides that “[a] statement of the declarant’s then-
existing state of mind [is admissible] . . . but [does] not includ[e] a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed.”76
And that gets us to our next hypothetical and principle.  This hypo-
thetical illustrates the particular utility of the state of mind exception
when the “state of mind” is “intent/plan.”  Robert is accused of armed
robbery of ABC Bank.  Robert is exercising his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent.  There is only a fuzzy surveillance video of the robbery,
and while the forensic or witness identification evidence is suggestive,
it is not conclusive that Robert is the robber.  But the prosecutor does
have evidence that Robert had no accounts or other business with the
 FED. R. EVID . 803(3).76
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bank.  So if the prosecutor can place Robert at the bank, this is some
further evidence that Robert was the robber.  So in order to prove that
Robert went to the bank, the prosecutor calls Robert’s sister, Wanda Sue,
to testify that Robert said he intended to go to the bank:
This evidence is admissible under 803(3) and 401.  Wanda Sue is the
witness.  She is recounting from her personal knowledge that an out of
court declarant (Robert) made a statement of his intentions (“I am going
to ABC Bank this afternoon”).  This is hearsay testimony if offered for
the truth of the matter asserted in the statement (Robert intends to go to
ABC Bank that afternoon).  An intent or plan is a state of mind.  The
evidence is relevant because a person having an intention to do some-
thing, while far from conclusive, is some circumstantial evidence that
the person later did that thing.  Thus, the evidence comes in.  This isolates
a fourth state of mind principle:  (4) The state of mind exception recog-
nizes intent or plan as states of mind, and intent/plan are relevant and
admissible as circumstantial evidence of later conduct in accordance with
the intent or plan.77
Now let us move a step closer to Hillmon through an example of a
statement where part of what is being asserted is not being explicitly
asserted.  This is a particularly fun example because we isolate the state
of mind principle by seeing that the same evidence is admissible under
either of two logical paths, one of which is a hearsay use while the other
is not.78
 Making this distinction between intent and memory may seem nonsensical as a77
theoretical precept.  That certainly was Seligman’s point.  But it is a point explicitly
rejected by the text of Rule 803(3).  FED . R. EVID . 803(3).
 This excellent hypothetical can be found in the Teacher’s Manual to the book,78
DEBORAH JONES MERRITT &  RIC SIM M ONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE 521 (2d ed. 2012).
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Fred fell from a tenth story balcony and died.  It might be suicide.  It
might be an accident.  And the lawsuit is by the beneficiaries of the life
insurance policy suing the insurance company, which has denied
coverage based on a conclusion of suicide.  At trial, the plaintiffs call
Will as a witness who testifies that on the afternoon of the death, Fred
told Will that Fred had just accepted a job offer.  The evidence is
admissible as relevant to the issue of whether Fred committed suicide. 
But it is interesting to isolate exactly why that is so.  There are two
equally valid evidentiary hypotheses that get to the same result.
Under the first evidentiary hypothesis, there is no hearsay testimony,
and so there is no state of mind issue.  Under this construct, Will is
testifying from memory and personal knowledge that Will observed Fred
on the afternoon of the day in question, and that Will observed Fred to
be in a good mood.  Will reached these conclusions based upon perhaps
a variety of observations or perceptions of Fred, one of which is that Fred
reported nominally good news in Fred’s life.  In other words, Will is
giving personal knowledge testimony of matters Will personally
perceived (the words Fred said, tone of voice Will heard Fred speak in,
and so on) and Will is drawing a conclusion from those perceptions that
Fred was in a good mood on the afternoon in question, which in turn
makes suicide that evening less likely.  The actual testimony is Will’s
conclusion about Fred’s mood. That conclusion is not hearsay.79
Diagrammed, this evidentiary hypothesis looks like this:
 Indeed, the conclusion is not even based on hearsay.  Will simply is testifying79
that, upon perceiving Fred saying certain things in a certain tone and presenting in a
certain manner, Will drew a conclusion: that person is in a positive frame of mind—not
suicidal.  The testimony Will is offering—Fred was in a good mood—is opinion
testimony, but it certainly is admissible lay opinion.  
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Under the alternative evidentiary hypothesis, Will’s testimony is
hearsay, but it is hearsay that is admissible under the state of mind
exception. Under this construct, Will is testifying from memory that Fred
said that Fred had just accepted a new job.  It is hearsay because Will is
testifying that while Fred did not literally utter the words, “I am in a good
mood,” that essentially this is what Will understood Fred to be asserting. 
Put another way, Will is describing an out of court declaration that
contains two asserted matters.  The first is Fred’s explicit assertion—“I
just accepted a new job.”  The second is Fred’s implicit assertion—“I am
in a great mood.” It is the second assertion, the implicit one, that we are
keenly interested in at trial—it is what is relevant—because people in a
great mood in the afternoon are less likely to be suicidal in the evening. 
In other words, in contrast to our first construct, which is non-hearsay,
here we have hearsay evidence.  But, it is admissible state of mind
evidence.  And that evidence is relevant circumstantial evidence of
whether the decedent committed suicide because a person reciting good
news is implicitly asserting they are in a good mood, which is circumstan-
tial evidence that they would not be suicidal just a few hours later, which
in turn is circumstantial evidence that they did not commit suicide. 
Diagrammed, this evidentiary hypothesis looks like this:
So this hypothetical elegantly illustrates that sometimes we have to
parse a sentence, and that the parsing requires a deeper dive than just
sentence diagramming words.   Sometimes words can have two or more80
 This notion of identifying an implicit assertion within hearsay is perhaps more80
familiar to us when looking at other exceptions, such as the “business records excep-
tion.”  FED . R. EVID . 803(6).  That exception allows the person making the record to
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assertions within them, one or more of which is implicit rather than
explicit.    And in this example, when we do that deeper dive, we see our81
next and last two state of mind principles: (5) The assertion that we
analyze under the state of mind exception may be explicit or implicit, and
(6) a statement can be making more than one assertion; if so, each
assertion is separately analyzed.
Finally, let us now turn to a much more Hillmon-like example.  This
example shows how all of these state of mind principles work together,
and where Hillmon and similar cases get confused.  And as a predicate,
let’s remember what those state of mind principles are:
1. The state of mind exception applies to the state of mind, not to the
reason for the state of mind;
2. The state of mind exception does not in and of itself result in the
admission of hearsay evidence; hearsay evidence that is state of
mind still may be excluded unless it is relevant to the issue the
proponent is seeking to prove;
3. Having a memory of something, while relevant to whether that
event occurred, is not admissible as evidence that it occurred;
4. The state of mind exception recognizes intent or plan as states of
mind, and intent/plan are relevant as circumstantial evidence of
later conduct in accordance with the intent or plan;
5. The assertion that we analyze under state of mind exception may
be explicit or implicit; and
6. A statement can be making more than one assertion; if so, each
assertion is separately analyzed.
Here is our hypothetical: Victor has been found dead on the steps in
front of the library.  There is no forensic evidence helping to identify
compile information from other persons within the business.  Although this constitutes
hearsay within hearsay, it is still within the scope of the exception.  So, when looking
at a business record, we do not worry that implicitly it is compiling data from multiple
sources of information within the business.  Yet, undeniably, that is what is occurring
—the business record has implicit assertions within it.
 Another evidence doctrine where the lesson that sometimes assertions are implicit81
is illustrated in the doctrine of non-verbal assertive conduct.  It is well understood that
non-verbal conduct—such as pointing as a way of identification—can be hearsay.  The
notion is that implicit in the conduct is an assertion.
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Victor’s killer.  But Wendy recounts that she had lunch with Victor one
hour before the murder, and Victor said to Wendy that Victor intended
to go to the library to talk to Dan.
For obvious reasons, the prosecutor thinks Dan is the killer.  Here is
the evidentiary hypothesis:
But to diagram the evidence this way actually obscures that Dan made
two assertions to Wendy, and unpacking one from the other exposes an
evidentiary problem—one assertion is admissible under the state of mind
exception but is not relevant to whether Dan went to the Library, while
the other is relevant to whether Dan went to the Library but not admissi-
ble under the state of mind exception:
Admissible as State of Mind but not Relevant (to whether Dan went to
the Library):
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Relevant (to whether Dan went to the Library) but not Admissible as State
of Mind:
In other words, Victor is stating his intention to go to the Library to
meet Dan.  But per state of mind principle 6, Victor’s statement has more
than one assertion—an explicit assertion of Victor’s intent and an implicit
assertion of Dan’s schedule—and for purposes of analysis each assertion
must be analyzed separately.  Per state of mind principle 5, it does not
matter that one of the assertions—Victor knows something that gives him
reason to believe that Dan will be at the Library in one hour’s time—is
implicit.  Per state of mind principle 4, Victor’s first assertion is of
Victor’s intent that qualifies as a state of mind that can be used to prove
that Victor went to the Library.  But per state of mind principle 2, this
is insufficient for the first assertion to be admissible on the issue the
prosecutor is trying to establish—that Dan was at the Library.  And per
state of mind principles 1 and 3, the second assertion, which is relevant
to that issue, does not fit within the state of mind exception.
Stated yet another way, Victor’s assertion is highly relevant.  It puts
Dan in the right place at the right time. But it is built on some unspoken
and unknown source of information.  Perhaps Victor and Dan had
discussed the matter.  Perhaps Victor simply knew of Dan’s regular
habits.  Perhaps Victor had stolen a glance at Dan’s calendar on Dan’s
iPhone.  Or perhaps someone else had told Victor that Dan was going to
be at the Library.  We will never know.  Victor is not alive anymore to
recount why Victor thought Dan would be at the Library in one hour’s
time.  We cannot test either the accuracy of Victor’s belief or even
Victor’s sincerity.  It is “rank” inadmissible hearsay that neither is nor
should be subject to Rule 803(3).
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So now let us return to Hillmon, and its evidentiary hypothesis.
We now can see that it is actually conflating three evidentiary claims.
Evidentiary Claim 1:
Evidentiary Claim 2:
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Evidentiary Claim 3:
The second of this triumvirate is the one of interest.  Once exposed it is
a blatant violation of state of mind principles because it is using the
declarant’s statement of memory as evidence of the truth of the facts
remembered.
Now, one of my colleagues, Professor Mario Conte, responds to this
by saying: “How do you know that Walters was remembering something;
he might have been standing right next to Hillmon and writing as Hillmon
was talking?”  To which I say, “That’s possible, but then you would be
arguing for admissible hearsay under the recorded recollection and/or
present sense impression exception, but because Walters is dead you have
no way to lay the foundation.”
Indeed, this exemplifies why Hillmon-like statements are inadmissible
hearsay.  We do not know how Walters knows whatever he knows. 
Maybe he is speaking to Hillmon.  Maybe he spoke to Hillmon in the near
past, or the far past.  Maybe they have a mutual acquaintance and
communicated secondhand.  Maybe Walters has just heard some loose
talk about Hillmon, and hopes he can tag along with Hillmon, assuming
the talk is true.  We do not know, and we cannot ever know.  Walters
recounting a memory is the most likely explanation, but not the theoreti-
cally only possible one.  But what we do know is that whatever the
explanation, the foundation for an exception cannot be provided.  To the
contrary, the evidence—because of its unknown and untestable nature—is
precisely the sort of thing hearsay is meant to exclude.
Conclusion
So as we can now see, the Hillmon decision was wrong.  The Supreme
Court did not recognize that it was dealing with a hearsay assertion of
a memory, and so allowed the evidence.  Once the Court defined—albeit
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erroneously—the terms of its analysis, the mistake in definition was never
explicitly revisited.  But once it is explicitly revisited, the flaw in Hillmon
is patent, and the contemporary debate about intent evidence melts away. 
A declarant’s statement of intent simply is not admissible evidence of
a non-declarant’s actions.
Unfortunately, lawyers and judges these days are almost as unlikely
to read law review articles or essays as they are to read law school texts
or treatises.  So what should be done?  Here is a modest proposal:  Add
one line to Rule 803(3): “Under no circumstances, however, shall this
section apply to result in a statement of the declarant’s then existing state
of mind to be admissible as evidence of the later actions of someone other
than the declarant.”  That ought to minimize the instances in the future
of courts falling prey to an alluring and enduring jurisprudential error.
